In 1970, a district court observed: "We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing cases more than a little confusing and certainly beyond our powers of reconciliation." 1 The court could hardly have been faulted, for the confusion it noted has been endemic to these cases since the creation of the treble-damages action. Courts have never read section 4 of the Clayton Act' literally to allow treble damages to every plaintiff able to attribute an economic loss to an antitrust violation. 3 This unwillingness to recognize every such injury is fully consistent with the essential principle of antitrust law-that the antitrust laws protect competition as a whole, not individual competitors.' Instead of relying upon this substantive principle, however, courts have often used common-law rules of proximate cause to restrict the number of potential plaintiffs. These rules of tort have produced results inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law and have been responsible for much of the confusion in standing case law. 2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides, inter alia: "[Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) . This Note will not address standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) . Standing under § 16 may be available to plaintiffs who lack standing to sue for treble damages under § 4. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573, 589-94 (3d Cir. 1979) . Section 16 has been applied more expansively than § 4 both because its language is less restrictive-requiring merely a showing of "threatened loss or damage" rather than injury to "business or property"-and because multiple suits under § 16 against the same defendant do not pose the dangers of duplicative recovery and overdeterrence that multiple suits under § 4 might threaten. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-62 (1972) .
3. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.) ("Read literally, [section 4] could afford relief to all persons whose injuries are causally related to an antitrust violation. Recognizing the nearly limitless possibilities of such an interpretation, however, the judiciary quickly brushed aside this construction."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) .
4. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) . Although some controversy remains among scholars as to whether the antitrust laws should be concerned only with furthering consumer welfare in a strictly economic sense, see Sullivan, Economics and More Humanis- 66 (1978) ), and has condemned only those practices that "tend to restrict competition and decrease output," see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) . This Note takes no position on this controversy; it merely seizes upon the Court's most systematic assertions of purpose and attempts to build a coherent approach to standing consistent with substantive antitrust law.
5. The high cost of litigation makes this confusion especially expensive and the need for a coherent standing doctrine particularly great. Cf Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (danger of "vexatious litigation" counsels summary disposition of antitrust cases when permissible).
This Note argues that the application of tort analysis to questions of standing under section 4 has stemmed from a failure to recognize the nature of the per se standard in antitrust law. Once the limited scope of that standard is appreciated, a standing doctrine more consistent with the concerns of substantive antitrust law can be developed. The standing approach this Note endorses-one that looks to market effects rather than to the peculiar circumstances of a plaintiff's injury-is hardly novel; indeed, one of its chief virtues is that it draws support from several recent Supreme Court cases. By discussing the interplay between standing and substantive antitrust law, however, this Note supports and extends recent moves toward doctrinal clarity.
I. TOWARD A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO ANTITRUST STANDING
Every plaintiff seeking treble damages forces the court to answer two questions: First, what is the purpose of the antitrust laws? And, second, who is entitled to vindicate that purpose? If the plaintiff endeavors to show that the defendant's conduct towards him was "unreasonable," the very form of his case answers those questions. In contrast, if he alleges that the defendant's conduct was per se illegal, the truncated inquiry of that standard makes more difficult a court's adherence to the principles of substantive antitrust law.
A. The Per Se Standard
Although courts have, on occasion, considered such subsidiary goals as protecting independent businessmen and preventing large aggregations of capital, 6 they have generally held the promotion of free competition to be the primary concern of the antitrust laws. This focus upon consumer welfare, more pronounced in recent years, has been expressed in the Supreme Court's assertion that the rule of reason is the "prevailing standard" of antitrust law. 7 Under the rule of reason, the legality of a practice is judged, not by its effect upon any individual in the marketplace, but rather by its effect generally upon competition in a particular market. 8 The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
See
The rule of reason, however, is not the sole standard by which courts judge allegedly anticompetitive conduct. The Supreme Court has classified certain practices as per se illegal, conclusively presuming them unreasonable. 9 The per se standard has been applied to price fixing,' 0 horizontal allocations of markets," group boycotts,' 2 and tying arrangements.' 3 When a defendant is found to have engaged in one of these practices, a court will hold him liable without inquiring whether that conduct has actually had any disruptive effect upon competition.
As merely a "special case" of the rule of reason,' the per se standard is not intended to condemn conduct that the rule of reason would not bar. Nonetheless, the per se rules have often operated to expand the scope of antitrust liability. 15 In part, this expansion has been caused by the questionable validity of the presumptions made by certain per se rules. Expectations that vertical price fixing' 6 and certain kinds of boycotts' will in- 13. Strictly speaking, the rule against tying arrangements is not a per se rule: It does not presume that every tie-in will unreasonably restrain competition in the tied product market. Once certain standards for amount-in-commerce and market power in the tying product's market are satisfied, however, such an arrangement is deemed unreasonable without any inquiry into whether it actually has had adverse effects upon competition. variably disrupt competition may well be unfounded. The leverage theory, which underlies the per se rule against tying arrangements and argues that a firm can use its power in one market to force its way into another market, has been especially criticized." 8 By freezing certain theories into mechanically applied rules and by obstructing further analysis, the per se standard may condemn conduct that would have passed muster under the rule of reason. 9 Even if the government were the sole enforcer of the antitrust laws, this overbreadth would impose a cost on defendants in the form of increased liability, and on society by deterring socially efficient activities. The existence of the private action for treble damages, however, has created a second, less noticed, cost of the per se standard.
B. Standing and the Per Se Rules
The broad principle of compensation that section 4 of the Clayton Act enunciates appears inconsistent with antitrust law's focus upon competition in particular markets rather than upon the interests of individual competitors. Through the network of relationships based upon custom and contract that link various actors in the marketplace, a single antitrust violation may inflict economic losses upon a host of individuals in a variety of markets. 2 0 The causal connection of an individual's injury to an illegal practice, however, is no guarantee that competition in the individual's market has been affected in the least. 1 This tension between the goals of substantive antitrust law and those of the private treble-damages action has been resolved rather easily in cases decided under the rule of reason. Courts have required the plaintiff in such cases to relate his private injury to a more public wrong-a threat to competition in his own market. 2 2 Recent cases brought under the rule of reason have conditioned a plaintiff's standing upon his ability to define his market, to indicate how that market was affected by the conduct he challenges, and to attribute his price maintenance, should be lawful because they serve distributive efficiency without restricting output and thereby promote consumer welfare).
17. 23 Because these cases focus so clearly upon a particular market, courts can bar suits by a plaintiff who is not a participant in that market with little analysis. 2 4 The simplicity of standing analyses in cases under the rule of reason-as well as the relative infrequency with which plaintiffs rely exclusively upon the rule of reason"-probably explains why so few courts have examined standing in this context.
The per se standard, in contrast, severs the connection between plaintiff and market that simplifies standing under the rule of reason. The absence of any requirement that a per se plaintiff make specific market allegations" creates the danger that an unwary court might allow a plaintiff in a market unlikely to have been affected by the practice he challenges to pursue a treble-damages claim. Such errors permit the per se standard to impose greater penalties on a defendant than those he would have suffered had his practice been judged by the rule of reason. The consequences of such errors are especially great because of the extent to which plaintiffs rely upon per se theories and the ease with which arguably per se practices often can be identified. (where per se practice is alleged, "injury to the public interest and competition is inherent in the charges"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980) . 27. Although certain per se illegal practices, such as price fixing, might be much more difficult for a victim to detect than, say, a tying arrangement, many antitrust actions employing per se theories are not based upon the plaintiff's own identification of the violation. Prior government actions-or even that each per se rule presumes a particular practice harms particular markets, and by then permitting only plaintiffs within those markets to pursue per se claims.
The failure of many courts to appreciate this limited nature of the per se standard accounts for much of the confusion that has long plagued standing doctrine in antitrust cases. Reluctant to permit treble-damage actions by all individuals able to attribute an economic loss to a per se violation, but apparently unwilling to directly link standing to substantive antitrust law, those courts have often turned to tort law for principles to limit antitrust standing.
II. DIVERSE LOWER-COURT APPROACHES TO STANDING
Since the early years of the treble-damage action, antitrust standing analyses have relied-at least in part-upon principles of tort law. Those difficult standing questions most likely to inspire doctrinal pronouncements in the lower courts have arisen in the course of per se claims, and it is in applying this standard that courts are most likely to turn to proximate cause as a limiting principle.
A. The Direct Injury Test
Despite the absence of any explicit indication that Congress had intended to limit the scope of section 4,28 the sweeping promise of that provision has never been realized. Just as many courts decided that Congress had meant to condemn only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, 29 so too they turned to the common law of torts for guidance in interpreting the prior actions by other private parties-often alert potential plaintiffs to actionable injuries. See infra note 37.
28. While courts have frequently asserted that Congress must have intended that the same limiting principles used in tort law be applied to suits under § 4, see, e.g., Associated Gen. ))-whose language was taken from § 7 of the Sherman Act but expanded to include the offenses newly condemned by the Clayton Act-similarly fails to reveal any intent to limit antitrust standing. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 12,939 (July 29, 1914) (statement of Sen. Reed) ( § 4 "means, for all practical purposes, that every man who is hereafter injured by any concern violating the antitrust statutes can bring suit"); 51 CONG. REc. 9185 (May 6, 1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering) ("It must be plain that few corporations will care to run the risk of pursuing illegal methods knowing that they will make themselves liable, not merely to dissolution, but for the payment of damages to all parties injured.").
29. statutory standing provision. Defendants were held liable only for those injuries of which they were the "proximate" or "direct" cause."
This "direct injury" rule first emerged as a corollary of the traditional doctrine that only a corporation, and not its shaxeholders, may recover for injuries the corporation has suffered. 1 It became the prevailing approach to antitrust standing at least until the early 1950's and, in some circuits, into the 1960's.12 Courts adhering to the doctrine of direct injury concentrated upon whether the plaintiff stood in some relationship to the alleged antitrust conspirators or upon whether his injury had been intentionally inflicted. But this vague test of circumstantial relationship could yield inconsistent results, with the flagrancy of a violation often becoming a significant analytical factor. 3
B. The Emergence of the Target Test
Though the direct injury approach failed to provide a clear and consistent method of distinguishing cognizable from non-cognizable injuries, courts did not seriously consider any alternative during the first sixty-odd years of the Sherman Act's existence, perhaps because of the rarity of private antitrust actions during this period. 3 The 1950's, however, 33. In one instance, circuits split on whether standing should be allowed to a theater lessor alleging that an illegal conspiracy among various film exhibitors, including his own lessees, to divide up the exhibition market caused the lessor to lose profits on a percentage lease. [I]n order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of the conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has been committed which harms him. He must show that he is within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. 3 9 This formulation shifted the focus slightly, from how the plaintiff had been injured-directly or as a consequence of some other injury-to the "area of the economy" allegedly endangered, accenting the public nature of the antitrust laws.
Tort principles nonetheless continued to permeate lower courts' discussions of standing even as those courts applied the target test. An example of the Ninth Circuit's approach illustrates how that court's concern with foreseeability and intent operated to enlarge the scope of liability under the per se standard beyond that which a rule of reason analysis would have produced. In Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 4 the plaintiff alleged that his right to receive royalties from several films was impaired, and his income thereby diminished, by the defendant-distributor's practice of "block booking" those films with other, less popular films. 4 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing to sue for his "foreseeable" injuries. 42 The distributor's privity with the plaintiff-producer suggests that the injury in Mulvey was indeed foreseeable. That injury, however, was not caused by any disruption of competition in the producer's market. He had not lost profits because of a competing film's undeserved advantage; he suffered because his contracting partner-the distributor-had disfavored his interest."' Since the plaintiff made no effort to satisfy the elements of a rule of reason case, the court should not have permitted him to proceed.
By not recognizing the limited nature of the per se rule's presumptions, the Ninth Circuit thus allowed a plaintiff's invocation of that standard to circumvent a systematic standing analysis more consistent with substantive antitrust law. In contrast, several other circuits applied the target area test more "narrowly. ' 908 (1979) . However, the clear focus upon market effects inherent in a rule of reason analysis, see supra at pp. 1312-13, has ensured the consistency with substantive antitrust principles of target analyses in these cases. This Note has therefore concentrated upon per se cases, where such consistency has been less certain.
48. The Third Circuit abandoned target terminology and instead looked to the "particular factual matrix presented" by each case. See Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976) (factors in factual matrix include "the nature of the industry in which the alleged antitrust violation exists, the relationship of the plaintiff to the alleged violator, and the alleged effect of the antitrust violation upon the plaintiff"). The Sixth Circuit drew upon the Supreme Court's leading administrative law standing case-Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)-to formulate a broader standing test. The Circuit held that a § 4 plaintiff must allege an "injury in fact" (a real economic loss) to an "interest . . . arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the antitrust laws. 53 -enunciated an approach to private actions that allowed a more rigorous definition of the injuries cognizable under section 4. In Brunswick, several bowling centers challenged the acquisition-arguably in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act 54 -of several of their competitors by a larger national firm with considerable market power. Though the plaintiffs alleged that the acquiring firm had used predatory practices, they could prove only that the acquisitions had deprived them of profits they would have made if the acquired ently thought this zone quite large. It observed: "The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competition and thereby to protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects of any combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 521 F.2d at 1152. 49. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), where an independent wholesale and retail distributor of gasoline claimed to have been injured by his supplier's price discrimination, the Court upheld plaintiff's recovery of, inter alia, losses he suffered in his capacity as a gas station lessor. The Court found that the plaintiff was "no mere innocent bystander; he was the principal victim of the price discrimination practiced by [the defendant]. Since he was directly injured and was clearly entitled to bring this suit, he was entitled to present evidence of all of his losses to the jury." Id. at 649-50. Though the Court did not address whether the plaintiff would have had standing if his only relation to the illegal conduct had been as a lessor, its liberal language implied that such a suit would have been allowed if the lessor could allege that defendant had intended to harm him. Despite the absence of any explicit discussion of antitrust standing, Perkins thus seemed to support the tort law approaches in the area. centers had closed. 5 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' "lost" profits, caused by increased rather than decreased competition, were not "of 'the type that the statute was intended to forestall.' ' "56 Emphasizing that causal linkage to an antitrust violation is not enough, the Court demanded that a plaintiff suing under section 4 prove "antitrust injury" and relate his loss to the procompetitive policies expressed in the antitrust laws. 57 Brunswick thus authoritatively gave greater precision to the principle that underlay the narrow target area approach: Even if the plaintiff can show an antitrust violation, courts should allow treble damages only for injuries reflecting a disruption of competition in the plaintiff's market. The Brunswick Court's citation of Wyandotte reveals the continuing influence of tort law on the Court's interpretation of § 4. In Wyandotte, the Court had followed a "general rule of the law of torts,"-for which it cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 286 (1965)-and implied a right of action from a criminal statute because plaintiff's interest "fell within the class that the statute was intended to protect" and "the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute was intended to forestall." 389 U.S. at 202. 58. From this perspective, Brunswick was an easy case. The, plaintiffs may well have shown a violation of § 7-the mere possibility that a large firm active in many markets will cut prices or use other monopolization tactics in a new market is enough to show a § 7 violation-but they failed to show that their losses stemmed from the realization of this possibility. The defendant had merely kept afloat businesses that otherwise would have failed. It had not affected prices in any way. The "lost profits" the plaintiffs complained of were the result of the very situation that the antitrust laws are supposed to encourage-free competition among as many firms as a market can support. 429 U.S. at 488. The Brunswick Court's reasoning was heavily influenced by Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1127, 1130-36 (1976) . See 429 U.S. at 487 n.11.
451 U.S. 557 (1981).
In Truett Payne, a car dealer sued his supplier, alleging that the supplier had violated § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982), by forcing him to pay higher prices than had been charged to other dealers. The plaintiff sought damages for the difference between the prices he had paid and the lower prices offered to his competitors. Like § 7 of the Clayton Act, however, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is a prophylactic provision, which may be violated even without any actual effect upon competition. The Supreme Court therefore followed Brunswick and rejected this "automatic damages" claim. It held that the plaintiff would have to show that the price discrimination had actually affected competition among retail dealers and thereby caused his injury-that, as a result of the difference in costs, his competitors could profitably lower their retail prices and draw customers away from him. 451 U.S. at 562. His damages would therefore be measured not by the difference in prices, but by the profits he lost. 65. The rule, of course, should not be applied in all chain-of-distribution contexts. Courts should, for example, permit both a wholesaler and a manufacturer to seek recovery for profits lost as a result of a competing manufacturer's alleged price discrimination or predatory pricing. Their damages, in such a case, consist of their lost profits, not the higher price paid by the wholesaler; the concerns of a rule addressing the passing-on of an injury are therefore not implicated. . 1982) (applying Illinois Brick to bar suit by plaintiff seeking damages for losses suffered when forced to sell, at depressed price, stock in corporation that defendants allegedly boycotted). Since stock values are not solely a function of corporate revenue, the loss of the plaintiff in Stein had not truly been "passed-on" to him.
The Brunswick
68. The Court admitted that its holding denied "recovery to those indirect purchasers who may
B. Brunswick and Standing Doctrine
Some courts and commentators treated Brunswick as irrelevant to standing doctrine. Because the standing of the Brunswick plaintiffs had never been challenged, these readers concluded that only a trial on the merits could determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an "antitrust injury." 6 9 They failed to realize that the Brunswick plaintiffs' allegations of predatory pricing had made a grant of standing quite proper. If the plaintiffs had, at the outset, attributed their losses solely to the continued existence of their competitors instead of alleging a disruption of the market, their lack of "antitrust injury" and of standing would have been clear from the start. Whether a plaintiff's claim is defeated at the standing stage or the damages stage may thus be merely a matter of when his theory of causation becomes clear. 7 Some lower courts used Brunswick solely to reinforce their own diverse approaches to standing. 71 Indeed, the Second and Seventh Circuits were quite correct in using Brunswick to confirm their tests' results. As the Second circuit's decision in Fields Productions illustrates, any disruption of the plaintiff's market. The analysis implicit in Brunswick focuses first on the plaintiff's market and then on whether the plaintiff, through either a per se claim or rule of reason allegations, can indicate some effect upon that market.
After Brunswick, therefore, the Ninth Circuit's refusal to abandon the doctrine that permitted standing to the kind of plaintiff barred by Fields Productions was unjustified. By continuing to consider intent and foreseeability in its analysis of standing in per se claims, the Ninth Circuit expanded the scope of section 4 beyond that allowed by Brunswick." In Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,7 5 for example, a former sales manager alleged that his employer had forced his resignation to prevent him from interfering in a conspiracy to fix prices. Even though the plaintiff clearly had failed to indicate any disruption of competition in his own market-the labor market-the Ninth Circuit found him to have standing under section 4. It reasoned that the "[d]ischarge of those who refuse to participate [in a price fixing conspiracy] is essential to success of the scheme"' and concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a direct injury.
Ironically-in light of its previous idiosyncratic approach"--the circuit most receptive to Brunswick was the Sixth. Following the Supreme 73. After Brunswick, in a case similar to Fields Productions, the Seventh Circuit recognized the essential identity between the "narrow" target approach and Brunswick's analysis. In Repp v. F.E.L. Publications, 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982), a composer of liturgical music challenged his publisher's practice of charging an annual blanket fee to those wishing to copy his and other composers' works. The court denied him standing. It observed that Brunswick's "antitrust injury" test could be understood through either the "direct injury" or "target area" approach, id. at 444, but that, regardless of which approach was used, Repp's injury did not implicate the concerns of the antitrust laws, id. at 447. As in block booking, the publisher's blanket licensing could conceivably have forced purchasers to buy unwanted titles and have limited the ability of other composers and/or the licensors of their works to compete in the market for musical works. These parties would thus have standing if they claimed injury. But, as the court observed, Repp's "access to the marketplace with musical works he owns" was "unaffected"; he therefore fell "outside the range of economic injuries intended to be protected by a declaration that the licensing practice is unlawful." Id. at 446 (emphasis in original).
74. Soon after Brunswick, a district court in the Ninth Circuit examined that decision's effect upon the authority of Mulvey, see supra p. 1317. Vaguely defining "antitrust injury" as any injury directly attributable to an antitrust violation, the court held that Mulvey remained controlling. The employer of the plaintiff in McCready had provided her with health-plan coverage from Blue Shield. As a condition of reimbursement, the plan required physician supervision over all visits to psychologists. In contrast, the plan automatically reimbursed subscribers for visits to psychiatrists. The plaintiff-subscriber had sought and received treatment from a psychologist without obtaining a physician's approval. When the plan refused to reimburse her for the costs of her treatment, she sought treble damages for the denied reimbursements from Blue Shield and from the group of psychiatrists that had allegedly aided in the design of the provision.
McCready thus presented the standard challenge to antitrust standing doctrine: An arguably per se illegal practice had affected a variety of victims, and the Court had to determine which of these victims had suffered injuries cognizable under section 4. The challenged practice clearly resembled a boycott (albeit a conditional one) of the psychologists, initiated by competing psychiatrists. losses for standing purposes would clearly be "antitrust injuries," within the meaning of Brunswick. The per se rule against boycotts presumes that competition in their market would have been endangered by defendants' practice. The question in McCready was thus whether the plaintiffsubscriber could also claim an "antitrust injury." By considering this question, the McCready Court authoritatively recognized Brunswick's applicability to standing analyses. 8 3 Moreover, as Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted, the injury claimed by the plaintiff was distinct from the injuries that psychologists might have suffered. 4 The limited reading that the McCready Court gave Brunswick, however, permitted it to shift its focus from the market analysis implied by Brunswick to the circumstantial connection of the plaintiff's injury to the defendants' illegal practice. 8 5 The Court reasoned that only by denying reimbursements to those subscribers who made unapproved visits to psychologists could the defendants place the psychologists at a competitive disadvantage. The harm to the plaintiff was thus "a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy."88 Indeed, her injury was "inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy market. 8s7 These formulations harken back to those cases where a court's view of the directness of a plaintiff's injury controlled and ignore the fact that the question of whether an injury is "intertwined" with an antitrust conspiracy's ends is irrelevant to the market analysis demanded by Brunswick." 8 85. In a footnote, the Brunswick Court had observed that a § 4 plaintiff need not "prove an actual lessening of competition in order to recover. . . . [Clompetitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened." 429 U.S. at 489 n.14. This observation addressed predatory practices which, though they might initially benefit consumers by lowering prices, are condemned because of their ultimate effects. The theory of predatory pricing is that once prices are so low that most competitors are forced to drop out of the market, the price-cutting firm can recoup its losses by profiting from the newly diminished competitiveness of its market. The initial losses to the competitors are therefore antitrust injuries because they are of significance to the entire market; the competitors are thus allowed § 4 standing. In their dissenting opinions, justices Rehnquist and Stevens also followed Brunswick's analysis, but they quarreled with the Court's characterization of the defendants' behavior with respect to the plaintiffs. They noted that the "boycott" the Court discerned seemed more akin to a seller's refusal to provide a commodity on the precise terms sought by a consumer than to a concerted refusal to deal; the plaintiff had simply sought reimbursements for the cost of services not covered by her plan. Id. at 490-91 & n.7 (Rehnquist J., dissenting); id. at 494 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. 688 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1982). 90. The plaintiff-producers alleged that the defendant-television network had block booked certain programs they had produced, thereby depriving plaintiffs of some of the royalties they otherwise would have received. Id. at 691-93.
91. The district court had found the plaintiffs lacked standing; it reasoned that Mulvey, on which plaintiffs relied, should be considered overruled by Brunswick. Aurora Enters. v. NBC, 524 F. Supp. 655, 659 (C.D. Cal. 1981). The Ninth Circuit reversed. It asserted that McCready-decided after the trial court's decision-supported Mulvey, which thus remained "the law of this circuit." 688 F.2d at 693.
The Aurora court's emphasis upon the continued vitality of Mulvey led it to give little reasoning in support of its decision. But it did distinguish Brunswick in a remarkable way: "Competition was increased by defendants' actions in Brunswick; therefore, plaintiffs suffered no antitrust injury. In contrast, the alleged tying arrangement in the present case is a per se violation of the antitrust laws." 93. The Court might have been prodded by the justice Department. In a case that appeared to be more concerned with the antitrust labor exemption than antitrust standing, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief endorsing the lower court's holding as to the exemption but challenging that court's standing analysis. unions sued a membership corporation of building and construction contractors and its members, claiming that the defendants had pursued a concerted campaign against the plaintiffs. The defendants had allegedly induced members and non-members both to avoid entering into collective bargaining agreements with the plaintiffs and to disfavor those who had signed such agreements. Applying Brunswick, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's application of the target test 9 5 and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under section 4. The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint made the application of Brunswick simple and decisive. Not only did the complaint fail to identity the exact nature of the plaintiffs' injuries," 8 but it also alleged restraints only in the markets for construction contractors and subcontractors 97 without indicating that the plaintiffs' own market-the market for labor unions-had been affected. 9 " That the plaintiff unions were not participants in the carpentry-contracting market was so clear that the Court could easily distinguish McCready. 99 Thus, although the unions were the intended targets of the defendants' alleged conspiracy, the Court found their section 4 standing barred by Brunswick.' 00 Even while preventing the tort principle of intent from influencing its standing analysis, however, the Court conflated standing and causation by emphasizing the "indirectness" of plaintiffs' injury as an alternative ground for denying their standing."' The Court's reliance upon this common-law principle might, in part, be attributed to the many 95. The Ninth Circuit, applying its liberal target area analysis, granted the plaintiffs standing since the alleged injuries were not merely a "foreseeable consequence" of defendants' conduct but its "intended result." California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 538 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983) .
96. 103 S. Ct. at 911. 97. The Court recognized that any coercion directed at contractors and subcontractors might violate the antitrust laws. Its opinion, however, indicated its reluctance to invoke the per se rule against boycotts. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, observed that the "allegedly unlawful conduct involves predatory behavior directed at 'certain' parties, rather than a claim that output has been curtailed or prices enhanced throughout an entire competitive market." Id. at 909 n.40. Such a concern with actual market effects is appropriate only to a rule of reason analysis and might presage a reevaluation of the per se rule against boycotts.
98. Justice Stevens noted: "The amended complaint. . . does not allege any restraint on competition in the market for labor union services . . . . [Iun this case there is no claim that competition between rival unions has been injured or even that any rival unions exist." Id. at 903 n.14.
99. "In this case,. . . the Union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained." Id. at 909. 100. Id. at 909-10.
101. Id. at 910. The Court seems to have used "directness" in two related but distinct senses. Like lower courts using "directness" as a standing test, see supra pp. 1314-15, it noted the long and complex chain of causation that separated plaintiffs from the challenged conduct. 103 S. Ct. at 910-11. The Court also alluded, however, to the "vaguely defined links" in that chain. Id. lower-court cases that-lacking a more systematic approach-had drawn upon "proximate cause" to restrict the sweeping language of section 4.1°2 Another reason for the Court's discussion of proximate cause may have been the Court's desire to legitimize its use of Brunswick's analysis by rooting it in legislative history. Just as "proximate cause" limited tort recoveries, so, the Court argued, certain similar restrictions were implicit in section 4.'13 Therefore, "consequential" harms1 10 4 -such as those suffered by the plaintiffs in Associated General Contractors-were not cognizable in either tort or antitrust law.
There are two problems, however, with this particular resort to legislative history. First, as the Court itself recently observed in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 1 0 5 "[tihe intent to allow courts to develop governing principles of law, so unmistakably clear with regard to substantive violations, does not appear in debates on the treble-damages action created in section 7 of the original [Sherman] Act . . . ."'0 The legislative histories of section 7 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act are bereft of any indications that concepts such as directness were to have any relevance to determinations of standing.
10 7 Second, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his Associated General Contractors dissent: "An inquiry into proximate cause has traditionally been deemed unnecessary in suits against intentional tortfeasors."' 08 It is still too early to assess the impact of Associated General Contractors upon standing doctrine. If the decision will have any effects other than to confirm the primacy of Brunswick's analysis, it will be because the decision's proximate cause discussion can justify grants of standing based upon a plaintiff's circumstantial relationship to a violation. 10 9 Such departures, however, have yet to occur. 1 0 Since Associated General Contractors, lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's direction to analyze standing questions "in light of""' the factors delineated in that case." 1
